The controversy surrounding the Instruction of 25 October 2022 raises a fundamental legal question: how should a legal provision be interpreted when its wording allows for different interpretations and its background forms part of a process of historical redress? And why is it crucial to interpret the 2007 and 2022 Acts together?

Three key ideas

  1. The 2022 Law on Democratic Memory has an essential legislative precedent in the 2007 Law on Historical Memory. Both established special mechanisms for access to Spanish nationality, although their criteria and requirements are not identical.
  2. The controversy centres on the scope of the first sub-paragraph of the eighth additional provision of Law 20/2022. The Instruction of 25 October 2022 distinguishes between two situations within that sub-paragraph. The question is whether that distinction constitutes an admissible interpretation of the legal text or an extension that exceeds administrative powers.
  3. The interpretation of a law requires consideration of more than just its literal wording. Article 3.1 of the Civil Code takes into account the context, the historical and legislative background, and the purpose of the provision. These criteria enable interpretative doubts to be resolved, but do not authorise the creation of rights without legal basis.

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Controversy over Spanish nationality affecting the right to vote

For many families of Spanish descent, the memory laws have offered the chance to re-establish a legal link with Spain that historical circumstances had severed or hindered.

In such cases, the recognition of Spanish nationality can have a significance that goes beyond the mere completion of a registration process. It can also represent the restoration of a family and institutional relationship with the country of origin of previous generations.

However, in 2026, a dispute over the interpretation of the Law on Democratic Memory has taken on a dimension that goes beyond nationality procedures.

The Ombudsman has, in turn, lodged an petition for constitutional protection to the Constitutional Court, on the grounds that these measures may affect fundamental rights; however, on 21 October, the petition was declared inadmissible.

The situation raises two distinct questions.

  • The first is of a legal nature: Did the Instruction of 25 October 2022 correctly interpret the scope of the Law on Democratic Memory?
  • The second is constitutional: What limits must precautionary measures observe when they may restrict the exercise of the right to vote by Spanish citizens?

Both issues are related, but they are not equivalent.

A dispute over the legality of an administrative criterion does not, in itself, entail the revocation of recognised nationalities. Similarly, a precautionary measure relating to the electoral register must be examined in light of its specific scope, without confusing its effects with those of a final decision on nationality.

To understand the origins of this conflict, we must look back to the legislation of 2007.

The 2007 Historical Memory Act: a decisive precedent

Law 52/2007, known as the Historical Memory Act, introduced a special scheme for acquiring Spanish nationality by option.

Its seventh additional provision addressed family situations linked to emigration and exile for which no equivalent solution existed under the ordinary regime for acquiring Spanish nationality.

The legislation distinguished between two main categories, amongst other secondary categories.

  • On the one hand, it recognised the right to opt for Spanish nationality by descent for persons whose father or mother had originally been Spanish.
  • On the other hand, it extended that right to the grandchildren of those who had lost or been forced to renounce their Spanish nationality as a result of exile.

The difference between these two scenarios is particularly relevant to understanding the subsequent controversy.

Two situations with different conditions

  • In the first scenario, the seventh additional provision did not require proof of exile for all children of persons who were originally Spanish.
  • In the second, the loss or renunciation of nationality as a result of exile was indeed part of the legal description.

This structure demonstrates that the 2007 legislature had distinguished between family situations in which Spanish ancestry was the central element and others in which the circumstances of exile played a specific role.

The significance of this precedent does not lie in the fact that the 2007 Act automatically determines the meaning of the subsequent one. A previous provision cannot replace the text adopted by the legislature in 2022. Its relevance is interpretative: it allows us to identify how the matter had previously been regulated and which legislative solutions formed part of its background.

Article 3.1 of the Civil Code expressly recognises the value of historical and legislative background as criteria for interpretation.

For this reason, the seventh additional provision of Law 52/2007 constitutes a necessary reference for analysing the scope of the 2022 regulation.

Nationality as an instrument of redress

The 2007 legislation responded to a reality that went beyond the formal loss of nationality.

The Civil War, the dictatorship, exile and migratory movements had given rise to complex family situations, particularly amongst Spaniards settled in other countries and their descendants.

In certain cases, family and cultural ties with Spain had been maintained for generations without this being fully reflected in the legal recognition of nationality. The legislator sought to provide a specific response to some of these situations. However, the aim of redress did not eliminate the need to meet the conditions laid down by law.

This tension between historical redress and the principle of legality would re-emerge, with new elements, in the 2022 legislation, which was presented as a continuation and extension of the 2007 legislation.

The 2022 Law on Democratic Memory: continuity and new legislative responses

Fifteen years later, the Law 20/2022 on Democratic Memory once again addressed the personal and family consequences of the Civil War, the dictatorship and exile.

Its preamble positions the new legislation as a continuation of previous memory policies, whilst identifying the need to develop additional measures. Among the situations requiring a new response were the inequalities that had arisen within the same family: for example, siblings who, despite sharing the same ancestry, had not been able to obtain Spanish nationality under the same conditions because some were of legal age when their father or mother acquired it under the 2007 Historical Memory Act.

With regard to nationality, the eighth additional provision established a new opt-in regime covering various family situations.

These included descendants of Spaniards, as set out in its first sub-paragraph; sons and daughters born abroad to Spanish women who had lost their nationality through marriage to foreign nationals prior to the entry into force of the 1978 Constitution; and certain adult children of persons who had obtained Spanish nationality by descent through the mechanisms provided for by law.

The 2022 Act did not merely replicate the 2007 regulations, as it introduced new cases and employed a different legislative formulation.

A necessary clarification: Spanish nationality by origin

In this context, it is important to distinguish between the status of being Spanish by origin and the moment at which that nationality is legally acquired. Spanish legislation provides for cases in which a person may subsequently acquire Spanish nationality by origin through the exercise of a right of option.

It is important to distinguish between two terms which, although they may appear equivalent, do not necessarily have the same scope: ‘Spanish by origin’ and ‘originally Spanish’.

The status of ‘Spanish by origin’ is a legal category. It is generally attributed to those who have been Spanish since birth, but the legal system also provides for cases in which a person may subsequently acquire Spanish nationality by origin through the exercise of a right of option.

Therefore, being ‘Spanish by origin’ does not necessarily mean having been Spanish from birth. The expression ‘originally Spanish’, on the other hand, refers precisely to this temporal circumstance: that the person held Spanish nationality from the outset, even if they subsequently lost it or renounced it.

This distinction is particularly relevant when interpreting the laws on historical memory. The eighth additional provision of the Law on Democratic Memory expressly uses both terms: it refers, on the one hand, to fathers, mothers, grandfathers or grandmothers who ‘were originally Spanish’ and, on the other, to persons who were subsequently recognised as having ‘Spanish nationality by origin’ under the memory laws.

The different terminology used by the legislator is not irrelevant: it allows us to understand both the creation of specific mechanisms for acquiring nationality in memory laws and the need to carefully interpret their scope, taking into account the different legal categories used.

How significant is the reparative purpose of the 2022 Act?

The continuity between the two laws provides a relevant element for interpreting the eighth additional provision. However, we must avoid jumping to conclusions.

The legislator may extend a previous regulation whilst, at the same time, establishing specific conditions for each case. The purpose of the provision must be examined alongside its text, not used as a substitute for it.

The legally relevant question is, therefore, which interpretation of the eighth additional provision is consistent with its wording, structure, background and purpose.

That question goes to the heart of the dispute.

Eighth supplementary provision

This is where the dispute arises.

The first sub-paragraph of paragraph 1 of the eighth additional provision of Law 20/2022 links birth outside Spain, descent from parents or grandparents who were originally Spanish, and the reference to the loss or renunciation of nationality as a result of exile.

Its grammatical construction has given rise to different legal interpretations.

The question is whether the reference to exile should be understood as a condition common to all descendants covered by that sub-paragraph, or whether the text allows for a distinction to be made between situations with different requirements.

The restrictive interpretation: exile as a defining condition

According to an initial reading, the reference to the loss or renunciation of nationality as a result of exile defines the legal scenario.

From this perspective, proof of certain links to Spanish ancestry would not be sufficient on its own. The historical circumstances required by the provision must also be present, depending on how its wording is interpreted.

Those who defend this position consider that separating these elements could extend the subjective scope of the right of option beyond what was established by the legislator. Their argument is based on an important premise: the circumstances for acquiring Spanish nationality must have legal basis.

The Administration cannot create new beneficiaries by means of an instruction.

The interpretation of the 2022 Instruction: two distinct situations

The Instruction of 25 October 2022 adopted a different reading, taking a broad interpretation of the first paragraph. In its interpretation, it essentially distinguishes between two situations:

  • First: persons born outside Spain whose father, mother, grandfather or grandmother was originally Spanish, without requiring proof of exile in this case.
  • Second: persons born outside Spain whose parents or grandparents, who were originally Spanish, had lost or renounced Spanish nationality as a result of exile.

This distinction is the real subject of the controversy.

The Instruction does not merely set out which documents must be submitted to the Civil Registry. It also establishes an interpretative criterion regarding the scope of persons covered by the legal provision. The Instruction held that this did not envisage a single scenario subject to the cumulative requirement of exile, but rather two separate scenarios.

The question is whether this criterion is sufficiently supported by the text of Law 20/2022 and its legislative history.

The role of the 2007 Act in that interpretation

The seventh additional provision of Act 52/2007 had already provided for an option for children of persons of Spanish origin without requiring, in that specific case, proof of exile. This precedent raises a relevant question.

If the 2022 legislation was intended to continue and extend certain reparation measures, is it consistent to interpret its new text in such a way that exile becomes a general condition for family situations that had previously been treated differently?

The question does not, in itself, resolve the legal issue. But it demonstrates why the 2007 precedent is significant and why a purely grammatical reading may be insufficient to assess the criterion adopted in 2022.

From the perspective of Echeverría Abogados, the relationship between the two provisions provides a relevant basis for defending the interpretation of the Instruction. The validity of this basis, however, must be examined in light of the limits that the legal system imposes on administrative interpretation.

How laws should be interpreted within the Spanish legal system

The controversy cannot be resolved solely on the basis of a preference regarding what the scope of historical redress should be.

It is necessary to apply the legal criteria of interpretation.

This provision does not authorise the free choice of the outcome that seems most convenient. It requires the construction of a legally reasoned interpretation based on various elements.

Literal interpretation: the starting point for interpretation

The wording of the law is essential. They cannot be ignored or replaced by a merely presumed legislative intent. However, when a provision presents syntactic difficulties or admits more than one reasonable interpretation, a literal analysis may not be sufficient.

In such cases, the regulatory context and legislative background help to determine what meaning may be attributed to the text. The aim is not to depart from the law, but to understand it correctly.

The legislative background: continuity and differences

The laws of 2007 and 2022 demonstrate continuity in the legislature’s attention to certain historical consequences of the loss or interruption of legal ties with Spain. They also present differences in their scope and wording. Both elements must be taken into account.

It would be incorrect to interpret the 2022 Act as if the previous legislation had never existed. Nor, however, would it be correct to assume that the legislator necessarily retained all the conditions of 2007.

Interpretation requires identifying which conclusions can be drawn from the totality of these elements, without attributing an unequivocal intention to the legislator where the text allows for debate.

The purpose: guidance, not a substitute for the legal text

The reparative purpose of the Law on Democratic Memory constitutes a relevant interpretative criterion. It may help to resolve doubts regarding the meaning of a provision. However, it does not permit the indefinite extension of recognised rights nor the attribution of legislative powers to the Administration.

This limitation is particularly important when dealing with a special and temporary scheme for the acquisition of nationality. For this reason, the debate on the Instruction requires a distinction to be made between an admissible interpretation of the scope of application of the Act and a possible extension to cases not covered by it.

The function of the Instruction of 25 October 2022

The Directorate-General for Legal Certainty and Public Trust approved the Instruction of 25 October 2022 to establish criteria for the application of the eighth additional provision of the Law on Democratic Memory.

The new regulation was to be implemented through procedures at Civil Registry offices, including consular offices. Its implementation required common guidelines on documentation, processing and interpretative criteria. The Instruction addressed this need.

However, the debate over its legality cannot be resolved solely by identifying its administrative purpose.

Interpreting a rule does not necessarily amount to creating another

Article 6 of Law 40/2015 provides for instructions and service orders as instruments for directing administrative activity.

Their existence is compatible with the need for the Administration to interpret the regulations it applies. However, an instruction cannot be used to amend a law or to autonomously recognise rights that lack legal basis.

Therefore, the title of the document is not sufficient to determine its legal nature. Nor does its publication in the Official State Gazette automatically make it a regulation. What is decisive is an examination of its content and effects.

If the interpretation adopted finds sufficient support in the law, we will not be dealing with an act of a different nature from one that materially introduces a new regulation.

If, on the other hand, it establishes scenarios not covered by the statutory provision, the objection of exceeding one’s authority becomes relevant. This distinction lies at the heart of the second article in our series.

A dispute with implications for citizenship rights

The debate over the scope of the 2022 Instruction has taken on added significance due to its potential consequences for individuals whose Spanish nationality has been recognised.

In 2026, the Supreme Court adopted interim measures affecting the registration and electoral effects of the registration in the CERA of certain individuals falling within the disputed legal provision.

The Ombudsman has challenged these measures by lodging an appeal for constitutional protection. The dispute thus raises a separate constitutional issue regarding the validity of the administrative interpretation.

Legal certainty and the integrity of the electoral register constitute relevant interests.

Legal certainty and the integrity of the electoral register constitute relevant interests. However, the mere existence of an interpretative dispute regarding a nationality provision does not, in itself, determine that the electoral restrictions adopted are constitutionally admissible. These must be examined independently, taking into account their basis, scope and proportionality.

Conclusion

The dispute over the Instruction of 25 October 2022 cannot be reduced to a conflict between those who advocate a strict application of the law and those who invoke its reparative purpose. The issue is legally more nuanced.

The 2022 Law on Democratic Memory forms part of a legislative evolution whose immediate precedent, in matters of nationality by option linked to memory laws, is to be found in Law 52/2007.

Both pieces of legislation provided for special mechanisms for the acquisition of nationality, but their provisions are not identical. Consequently, interpreting the 2022 legislation requires an examination of its wording, its legislative history and its purpose.

The Instruction of 25 October 2022 distinguished between two situations within the first sub-paragraph of the eighth additional provision. That distinction lies at the heart of the controversy regarding its interpretative limits.

From the perspective of Echeverría Abogados, the legislative background and the purpose of Law 20/2022 provide relevant grounds for defending the interpretation adopted by the Directorate-General for Legal Security and Public Trust. However, these grounds must be weighed against the legal text and the limits of administrative action.

Interpreting a law requires understanding its history, but also respecting its limits.

This principle goes beyond the discussion on the Grandchildren’s Act.

When the recognition of nationality relates to the exercise of fundamental rights, legal precision has consequences that go beyond mere regulatory technique. Historical redress, legal certainty and the protection of citizenship rights must be examined together, without confusing their underlying principles or prejudging judicial decisions.

Understanding this distinction is the starting point for analysing both the legality of the Instruction and the constitutional implications of the measures adopted.

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