Can the 2022 Instruction be defended as a valid interpretation of the law? The controversy surrounding the eighth additional provision of the Law on Democratic Memory is not resolved by asking whether an administrative instruction can create rights: it cannot. The decisive question is another: whether the Directorate-General for Legal Certainty and Public Trust identified a legally admissible meaning of the law or whether it materially altered its scope.

Three key points

  1. The legality of the Instruction depends on its content, not its title. The legal system allows the Administration to establish interpretative criteria for applying laws, but not to recognise, through instructions, new grounds for acquiring nationality.
  2. The legal defence of the Instruction is found, principally, in its seventh guideline, section II.1. This explains why the Directorate-General considers that the Law on Democratic Memory combined in a single paragraph two grounds that the 2007 Law on Historical Memory had regulated separately.
  3. The most significant objection is grammatical and normative. The expression ‘and that’ can be interpreted as a cumulative list of requirements. The argument in favour of the Instruction must demonstrate why a historical and systematic reading allows for the distinction between two cases without creating a right by analogy.

The central issue

Did the Administration interpret the law or broaden its scope of beneficiaries?

The Instruction of 25 October 2022, approved by the Directorate-General for Legal Security and Public Trust, established criteria for applying the right to choose Spanish nationality recognised by the eighth additional provision of the Law 20/2022 on Democratic Memory.

Its interpretation of the first paragraph of that provision has given rise to a legal controversy of considerable scope.

The Directorate-General understood that the provision covers two distinct situations:

  • Certain descendants born outside Spain to parents or grandparents who were originally Spanish.
  • Descendants linked to the loss or renunciation of nationality as a result of exile.

Those who question this interpretation maintain that the law requires both elements to be present and that the Administration has unduly expanded the number of people entitled to apply for nationality.

The difference between the two positions is not merely terminological.

  • If the Instruction recognised a scenario not provided for by the law, there would be a serious objection on the grounds of administrative overreach.
  • If, on the other hand, it resolved a regulatory ambiguity using interpretative criteria recognised by the legal system, its action can be defended as a legitimate application of the law.

These grounds do not rest exclusively on the reparative purpose of the Law on Democratic Memory. They are based on a combination of its wording, the background to the 2007 legislation, the explanation contained in the Instruction itself and the criteria set out in the Article 3.1 of the Civil Code.

This argument must be examined without confusing two distinct questions:

  • Did the Administration have the power to issue instructions?
  • Was the specific criterion it adopted legally correct?

The first question concerns the nature of the instrument. The second concerns the limits of its content.

Can an administrative instruction interpret a law?

The Administration needs to interpret the provisions it applies. Without such interpretative activity, numerous procedures would be subject to disparate criteria, particularly when a law uses concepts that require clarification or presents difficulties of drafting.

However, the ability to interpret is not the same as the power to legislate.

Article 6 of Law 40/2015 and the limits of instructions

Article 6 of Law 40/2015 provides for instructions and service orders as instruments through which administrative bodies direct the activities of bodies hierarchically subordinate to them.

It also provides for their official publication where a specific provision so stipulates or where this is deemed appropriate in view of their intended recipients or effects.

A first conclusion can be drawn from this provision: the publication of an instruction in the Official State Gazette does not, by that fact alone, make it a regulation. Nor does it guarantee that all its content is valid.

The legal classification of an administrative act requires an examination of its substantive nature, its basis of competence and its effects.

In the context of the Civil Registry, the specific characteristics of its organisation and the functions assigned to the Directorate-General must also be taken into account. It would not be sufficiently accurate to reduce the status of the various registry offices to that of mere hierarchically subordinate bodies, as they are vested with their own powers and their heads assume responsibility for the processing and resolution of cases.

What is relevant in this regard is that the Directorate-General acts as the governing and advisory body of the Civil Registry, exercises supervisory and coordinating functions, and may issue, in matters falling within its remit, binding instructions, decisions and circulars.

What the 2022 Instruction actually does

The Instruction of 25 October 2022 sets out guidelines on the exercise and scope of the right of option, as well as procedural rules for processing applications at the Civil Registry offices.

Among other matters, it addresses the circumstances in which the right of option applies, the necessary documentation and the registration procedures. Its procedural function is clear. However, the controversy does not primarily concern the forms or the organisation of the files. It centres on the interpretation that determines who is eligible under the first sub-paragraph of the eighth additional provision.

This clarification prevents the construction of an overly simplistic defence.

It is not enough to assert that the Instruction does not grant nationality on an individual basis, because a general interpretation may have a decisive influence on the recognition of that right. The defence must demonstrate that the administrative criterion is supported by the law. And to do so, we must refer to the most important passage of the Instruction itself.

Guideline 7 of the 2022 Instruction

At this point, we shall address the legal basis for the 2022 interpretation.

The core of the reasoning is found in Guideline 7, Section II, point 1, which deals with persons who may exercise the right of option provided for in the first sub-paragraph of the eighth additional provision.

In that section, the Directorate-General does not merely list beneficiaries. It also explains why it considers a different interpretation to that which might result from a strictly grammatical reading to be admissible.

Its reasoning can be summarised in three steps.

1) Recognising the difficulty of the legal text

The eighth additional provision links birth outside Spain, descent from parents or grandparents who were originally Spanish, and the reference to those who lost or renounced their nationality as a result of exile.

The Directorate-General itself acknowledges that the paragraph may appear to refer solely to descendants of exiled persons. This acknowledgement is significant.

The Instruction does not begin by denying that a plausible restrictive reading exists. Rather, it acknowledges the difficulty and proposes to resolve it through a joint interpretation of the 2007 Act and the 2022 Act.

The defence of its legality must begin precisely there: with the existence of a controversy over the meaning of the text.

2) Referring to the seventh additional provision of 2007

The Act 52/2007 on Historical Memory regulated two distinct cases of eligibility for Spanish nationality by descent.

  • The first covered persons whose father or mother had originally been Spanish.
  • The second recognised this right for the grandchildren of those who had lost or been forced to renounce their nationality as a result of exile.

The distinction was legally relevant because exile was not a specific requirement under the first scenario.

The Directorate-General considers that this background helps to understand the new wording of 2022.

Its reasoning is based on the fact that the Law on Democratic Memory introduced additional cases of eligibility and that, within that legislative framework, it would not be consistent to interpret that the legislator intended to exclude, without clear justification, situations that had previously been recognised.

The Instruction concludes that the legislator would have combined the two scenarios of the seventh additional provision of 2007 into a single paragraph.

This conclusion is an administrative interpretation of legislative intent, not an incontrovertible statement of what the legislator intended to do. However, it possesses a characteristic that is important for its defence: it identifies a specific legislative precedent and explains how it influences the interpretation of the subsequent provision.

It does not merely invoke historical justice in general terms.

To understand the legislative background: in this article we analyse why it is crucial to interpret the 2007 and 2022 ‘memory’ laws together, the differences between their provisions on nationality and the origin of the dispute.

3) Distinguishing between two categories within the first sub-clause of the 2022 Act

Based on this background, the Directorate-General understands that the first sub-clause encompasses two groups.

  • The first includes persons born outside Spain to a father, mother, grandfather or grandmother who were originally Spanish.
  • The second comprises descendants born outside Spain to persons who were originally Spanish but who lost or renounced their nationality as a result of exile.

In the explanation provided in the Instruction, the expression ‘and who’ plays a decisive role, as it is interpreted as an element that allows the second scenario to be incorporated into the first, rather than necessarily imposing a cumulative requirement on all descendants.

This is precisely the point of contention.

The Directorate-General does not dispute that the legislator used that expression. What it maintains is that its meaning must be determined by taking into account the previous regulatory framework and the purpose of the new law.

The answer cannot be derived solely from the administrative title of the document. It requires the application of general criteria of interpretation.

Article 3.1 of the Civil Code

How is a systematic interpretation justified?

Article 3.1 of the Civil Code provides that provisions must be interpreted in accordance with the literal meaning of their words, in relation to their context, their historical and legislative background, the social reality at the time of application, and their spirit and purpose.

The provision does not allow the law to be freely substituted with the solution that seems most convenient. It requires the elements that determine its meaning to be considered together.

In the case of the Law on Democratic Memory, three criteria are particularly important.

1) The literal wording: an objection that cannot be ignored

The expression ‘and that’ provides a significant argument for those who advocate a cumulative interpretation. From that perspective, the provision would describe a single scenario whose requirements must be met cumulatively.

Spanish ancestry and the circumstances of exile would form part of the same legal condition.

This interpretation has one advantage: it aligns with an immediate grammatical reading of the provision. Those defending the Order should not downplay this. However, legal interpretation cannot automatically be reduced to the first possible grammatical reading when there are normative elements that justify examining another.

The question is whether the 2022 wording allows for a different reading without distorting its terms.

2) The legislative background: an argument in favour of continuity

The seventh additional provision of 2007 provides a particularly relevant precedent. It is neither a distant law nor a historical reference used merely because of a superficial resemblance. It is the previous regulation of a special nationality mechanism linked to policies on historical memory.

The 2022 Act revisited this matter, introduced new provisions and retained explicit references to the 2007 provision. This relationship supports the view that the 2022 legislature acted within a context of relevant legislative continuity. However, continuity does not imply identity.

A subsequent Act may amend requirements established by a previous one. Therefore, the historical argument is only convincing if it helps to explain an interpretation that can still be sustained on the basis of the new text.

That is the limit which the defence must respect.

3) The purpose of redress: a legal criterion, not an unlimited authorisation

The Law on Democratic Memory incorporates the aim of redressing certain historical consequences of the Civil War, the dictatorship and exile. That purpose forms part of its legislative context.

The Instruction uses this to justify an interpretation which it considers consistent with the continuity and extension of previous measures. From the perspective of Echeverría Abogados, this criterion reinforces the historical and systematic interpretation.

However, the reparative purpose does not permit the granting of nationality to any descendant of Spaniards, nor does it allow the legal conditions to be disregarded. Its function is to guide interpretation when the text admits different legally defensible interpretations.

The most difficult objection

Can the ‘and that’ be interpreted as two alternative scenarios? A serious legal defence must address the strongest objection raised by the opposing position.

If the legislator used a conjunction that normally combines elements, can an administrative instruction interpret it as a link between two distinct situations?

The answer requires distinguishing between what is grammatically most obvious and what may be legally admissible.

The opposing argument: the Administration would have removed a requirement

The restrictive interpretation maintains that Law 20/2022 describes a single scenario. According to this reading, the reference to exile and to the loss or renunciation of nationality delimits the beneficiaries of the first sub-clause.

If the Instruction recognises the right of option for descendants who do not demonstrate these circumstances, it would be disregarding a condition established by law. The consequence would be a substantive extension of the subjective scope of the right.

This objection is relevant because Spanish nationality cannot be acquired through an administrative decision that supersedes the legislative requirements. Nor can any extension be justified by an abstract appeal to the reparative purpose.

The favourable response: legal meaning is determined within the regulatory framework

The defence of the Instruction is based on a different premise. It considers that the first sub-paragraph should not be isolated from its immediate antecedent and that the 2022 provision allows for an integrated reading of the two previously distinct scenarios.

The disputed conjunction is thus interpreted within a broader legislative framework. The argument does not consist in asserting that ‘and that’ usually means ‘or’.

It consists in maintaining that, in this specific provision, the grammatical connection can be understood as part of a formulation that brings together distinct situations, taking into account the preceding legislative text and the purpose of the law.

This explanation provides a legal response to the literal objection. But it also allows us to identify its limitations.

The defence of the Instruction therefore depends on demonstrating that its interpretation remains within the legally possible meanings of the provision. This is a matter of legal interpretation, not of political or administrative preference.

Interpretation and analogy

This raises the question: why is this distinction decisive?

Article 4.2 of the Civil Code sets limits on the application of criminal laws, exceptional and temporary, to cases or time periods other than those expressly covered by them.

The provision is relevant because the special opt-in scheme under the Law on Democratic Memory was subject to a statutory time limit and is governed by specific regulations. It would not be permissible to use analogy to extend the right to opt-in, without legal basis, to situations not covered by the law. However, interpreting a provision and applying it by analogy are different legal operations.

Interpretation seeks to determine which situations are covered by the meaning of a provision. Analogy allows, where the legal system permits it, a regulation intended for one case to be applied to an uncontemplated case where there is a common rationale.

The argument in favour of the Instruction does not seek to reapply the 2007 Act to those not covered by the 2022 Act. It maintains that the 2007 precedent helps to interpret the scope of a provision currently in force from 2022. This distinction is fundamental.

The legislative precedent serves as a criterion for understanding the subsequent law, not as an autonomous source of a new right of choice.

An interpretation that goes beyond the permissible meaning of the text could, in practice, result in a material extension of the right, even if presented as a historical or teleological interpretation.

For this reason, Article 4.2 requires the utmost rigour in the argumentation. The defence of the Instruction must remain linked to Law 20/2022 and must not rely on an independent application of Law 52/2007.

The legality of the Instruction does not depend solely on its form

Having examined the interpretative basis, we can return to the question of its legal nature.

The 2022 Instruction contains procedural rules and interpretative criteria aimed at facilitating the registration of the Democratic Memory Act. These functions are compatible with administrative activity. However, the controversy centres on a specific aspect: the identification of the beneficiaries under the first sub-paragraph.

The question is whether this aspect is interpretative or innovative in nature.

What supports the view that it is interpretative

There are several elements that support this position.

  • Firstly, the Instruction expressly identifies the legal provision it seeks to apply.
  • Secondly, it acknowledges the interpretative difficulty of the text and develops a legal argument to resolve it.
  • Thirdly, it draws on a legislative precedent directly related to the matter.
  • Finally, it links its conclusion to the purpose of the Law on Democratic Memory.

These elements do not automatically make the interpretation correct. However, they show that the Directorate-General did not merely arbitrarily establish a new ground for nationality.

It formulated an interpretation that can be subjected to legal scrutiny.

What would constitute an overstepping of authority

The objection regarding overstepping of authority would be stronger if it were concluded that the first sub-paragraph of the eighth additional provision does not reasonably permit the distinction made by the Instruction.

In that case, the Administration would have attributed to the law a scope that the legislator did not establish.

It would not be sufficient to argue that the criterion favours applicants or that it serves a legitimate historical purpose.

The principle of legality requires that the acquisition of nationality be based on an applicable statutory provision.

This is why a defence based exclusively on Article 6 of Law 40/2015 would be incomplete.

What the Supreme Court ruled in 2026

The controversy took on particular significance with the legal proceedings concerning the electoral implications of the administrative interpretation.

In contentious-administrative appeal 1013/2026, brought by Iustitia Europa against the Resolution 204/2026 of the Central Electoral Board, the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court examined interim measures relating to registration or the electoral effects of registration in the Electoral Register of Absent Residents.

The Order of 12 October 2026 ruled on applications for reconsideration regarding the interim measures granted on 10 September.

The Chamber expressed significant legal doubts regarding the administrative interpretation of the eighth additional provision. These observations must be given serious consideration.

However, it is essential to clarify its scope.

A provisional assessment is not equivalent to a judgment on the merits

Interim measures are adopted within judicial proceedings to address specific needs for provisional protection. Their examination does not have the same purpose nor necessarily the same depth as the final resolution of the dispute.

In the Order of 12 October, the Chamber frames its considerations on the interpretation of the law within the context of the interim analysis and distinguishes that examination from the decision on the merits. It would therefore be incorrect to state that this ruling definitively declared the 2022 Instruction to be unlawful. Nor would it be correct to ignore the doubts expressed by the Supreme Court.

The legally rigorous position is to recognise both circumstances.

The subject matter of the proceedings also matters

Proceedings 1013/2026 concern the challenge to a decision by the Central Electoral Board.

The interpretation of the Instruction arises in the dispute because it is related to the electoral effects at issue. However, this does not automatically turn the proceedings into a direct appeal against the Instruction.

This distinction is essential to understanding the scope of the rulings.

An interim decision on the electoral register does not, in itself, amount to a general annulment of the nationalities recognised through registration procedures.

The Order also includes a dissenting opinion by Judge María Alicia Millán Herrandis, whose assessment of the measures adopted merits specific analysis.

This examination forms the subject of the third article in the series, devoted to the constitutional implications of the dispute.

What the dispute means for those who acquired Spanish nationality

The legality of the Instruction and the individual legal situation of those who acquired nationality are related but distinct issues. The dispute over the interpretative criterion does not allow us to conclude that all nationalities recognised in accordance with it have been automatically annulled.

Individual legal situations require appropriate treatment in accordance with the grounds for acquisition, the applicable procedures and any decisions that may eventually be handed down.

This clarification does not mean that a dispute over legal interpretation is without consequences. It means that such consequences should not be presumed or extended beyond what has actually been decided.

Legal certainty requires a distinction to be made between the challenge to a general criterion, the review of specific proceedings and any interim measures that may affect the exercise of certain rights.

When the debate centres on the right to vote of Spanish citizens, a distinct constitutional dimension also comes into play.

For further information on the legal certainty of the Grandchildren’s Act, see the article The Grandchildren’s Act and the right to vote: what is at stake before the Constitutional Court where we will examine the Supreme Court’s interim measures, the dissenting opinion and the Ombudsman’s appeal for constitutional protection.

Conclusion

Defending the Instruction requires demonstrating that it interprets the law, not that it replaces it. The controversy surrounding the Instruction of 25 October 2022 raises a fundamental issue concerning the rule of law. The Administration must apply the laws and, to do so, needs to interpret them. However, this function does not allow it to replace the legislator or create rights to nationality without legal basis.

The problem lies in determining on which side of that boundary the interpretation of the eighth additional provision falls.

From the perspective of Echeverría Abogados, there are relevant legal grounds for arguing that the Directorate-General remained within its interpretative remit.

The seventh guideline identifies a drafting difficulty, refers to a directly related legislative precedent and proposes an interpretation consistent with the reparative purpose of the Law on Democratic Memory. Article 3.1 of the Civil Code provides the framework for assessing this reasoning.

The argument in favour of the Instruction does not need to deny the strength of the opposing grammatical argument. It must demonstrate that the historical and systematic interpretation is compatible with the legal text.

That is the true criterion of validity: not whether the interpretation is broader or more restrictive, but whether it remains within the legally admissible meanings of the law.

If the interpretation falls within those limits, it can be argued that the Administration did not create a new right, but rather clarified the scope of one established by the legislature. If it exceeds those limits, the remedial purpose would not suffice to justify it.

The existence of a legal dispute does not eliminate the need to carry out this analysis rigorously. Nor does it allow for the anticipation of a definitive conclusion that still needs to be examined within the relevant proceedings. The discussion also offers a lesson of broader scope.

Historical redress, legal certainty and the protection of citizens’ rights are not necessarily incompatible objectives. However, each must be upheld through the appropriate legal instruments.

The legality of the preliminary investigation requires a well-founded interpretation of the Law on Democratic Memory. The protection of the right to vote, for its part, requires a specific examination of the measures that may limit its exercise.

Keeping these two issues separate does not weaken the legal defence; rather, it makes it more precise and robust.

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